Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in the Fergana Valley of Kyrgyzstan

Mané Berikyan and Aurora Cody
Executive Summary

A country once revered as an "island of democracy" in an otherwise authoritarian region, Kyrgyzstan now grapples with navigating the recent aftermath of a Soviet legacy and the pursuit of self-interest in a 21st century context. Despite having undergone three revolutions and significant democratic progress over the last three decades, Kyrgyzstan's sociopolitical landscape is riddled with modern challenges and lingering remnants of a non-democratic past. A cyclical history of ongoing ethnic violence in the Fergana Valley and the recent rise in nationalism remain glaring stains on Kyrgyzstan's human rights record.

In order to address underlying ethnic tensions and avoid another outbreak of ethnic violence in the Fergana Valley, promote reconciliation and ease sensitivity surrounding the issue, the Kyzgyz government must pursue justice for the case of Azimjan Askarov by concluding a comprehensive investigation and holding guilty parties accountable. Additionally, the Japarov government and future administrations must immediately end arbitrary detentions, torture and violations of civil liberties at the local level in accordance with the ruling of the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights, re-asses all cases relating to the Osh 2010 events, and promote transparency and representation in the appointment of local authorities.

In order to mitigate ongoing violence at the Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan border, the Kyrgyz government must take steps to demilitarize the situation at the border and defer power to civilians and local authorities. By allowing room for civil society and human rights organizations to function within exclaves of Tajikistan along the border and surrounding regions, the government can promote local cooperation on land, water and pasture management in the short-run and promote future peace in the long-run.

Background

Introduction to Kyrgyzstan and the Fergana Valley 1Liam Abbate. "The Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Border: A Legacy of Soviet Imperialism." Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship 4, no. 1 (2021): 4, 2The Fergana Valley of Central Asia is divided between the three former Soviet Republics of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. The borders were largely irrelevant during the seventy years of the Soviet era, as the ethnic Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, and Tajiks "became accustomed to their ability to cross the inter-Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR), as the [Fergana] Valley lacked the border controls present in other areas of the Soviet Union."1 With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the borders drawn arbitrarily from Moscow did not reflect the ethnic makeup on the ground, leading to a "mismatch of residency and identity" in the Fergana Valley.2

This mismatch of ethnicities within each new Republic led to poorly-defined borders and "the problems of enclaves and exclaves" – there are five Uzbek and two Tajik exclaves on Kyrgyz territory.3 The most populous city in southern Kyrgyzstan is Osh, and the census in 2009 "showed Uzbeks to have almost equal numbers with Kyrgyz in Osh city and to be a substantial minority in the two main southern regions."4

Kyrgyzstan's mountainous geography has led to differing identities in different parts of the country. Kyrgyzstan is bisected by the Fergana spur of the Tien Shan mountains–the mountains split the country into a northern and southern half. Although the divide is not huge, this physical separation has lead to a north-south split within Kyrgyzstan–southern Kyrgyz were a part of the Kokand Khanate before the Russian Empire, and are used to living with ethnic Uzbeks and Tajiks, and reflect more of the Central Asian traditions. 5 Northern Kyrgyz, however, have a more nomadic culture, and were not as influenced by the Kokand Khanate.6 Northern Kyrgyz are also considered more Russified than southern Kyrgyz, since Russian-language channels are more readily available in the north due to the proximity to Russia, and some state-run media channels do not even reach the 650 kilometers from the capital, Bishkek, to the southern city of Osh, meaning that southern Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks rely more on media from Uzbekistan.

The north-south split has become a problem in the post-Soviet era. Under the USSR, "regional distinctions did not prove contentious...when the Communist-run planned economy provided for a relatively even standard of living".8 Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the once economically prosperous Fergana Valley has been hit by "falling commodity prices of goods produced in Central Asia including cotton, wheat, oil and gas," which has been "compounded by growing rates of poverty and unemployment".

Increasingly frequent conflicts between Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan over natural resources, especially over water infrastructure and pastures, have taken on ethnic undertones, becoming increasingly intractable. Kyrgyzstan has had a tumultuous political climate since attaining independence in 1991. Consistent with many other post-Soviet states, the struggle to redefine a Kyrgyz national identity separate from the Soviet Union has bred a type of "nationalism [which] leads to a politics of cultural and linguistic exclusion, generates violent, bottom-up mobilisation, and creates conditions for ethnic tensions."10 This is especially difficult in Kyrgyzstan, considering the territorial ambiguity due to the ill-defined borders in the Fergana Valley. Kyrgyzstan has had three revolutions in the three decades post-independence: in 2005, 2010, and most recently in 2020, which brought current President Sadiyr Japarov to power in January 2021.

The Rise in Nationalism

Promoting nationalism is a common tool of nation-building in the post-Soviet sphere as part of efforts by new governments to define an identity outside of the USSR. Kyrgyzstan's first President after independence, Askar Akayev, attempted to reconcile "the country's inter-ethnic stability by proclaiming Kyrgyzstan a homeland for all its inhabitants, and special pledges to the titular nationality".11 Modern Kyrgyz statehood emphasizes "the would-be presence of an ancient people on present territory," and that this presence "confers contemporary political legitimacy, and implies that the geography of the titular group intersects with that of the state".12 The conference of the modern Kyrgyz state with the ancient Kyrgyz people has laid the groundwork for the current ethnic tensions and potential for ostracization of non-ethnic Kyrgyz.

Language politics are an important byproduct of the nationalist shift in Kyrgyz politics. President Japarov is a populist, and has publicly called for the emphasis of the Kyrgyz language over the USSR-standard of Russian. On the Kyrgyz Day of the State Language, President Japarov stated in a speech that "language policy is an integral and priority direction of state policy, which obliges each of us to contribute to the development of the Kyrgyz language and its acquisition of the real status of the state language."13 Since the use of the Russian language was standard across the USSR, and most State business in Kyrgyzstan has been conducted in Russian since independence, language politics did not threaten to cause ethnic conflict. The recent shift to the Kyrgyz language, however, risks alienating the ethnic Uzbeks and Tajiks in the Fergana Valley of Kyrgyzstan, who are not ethnic Kyrgyz. The Kyrgyz government has also made explicit efforts to suppress minority languages, especially after the ethnic violence in June 2010 in Osh between majority Kyrgyz and minority Uzbeks. Before the clashes, there were "three Uzbek-language TV stations and two Uzbek-language newspapers, all owned by ethnic Uzbeks," and after the violence one TV station never reopened, and the rest of the outlets were taken over by ethnic Kyrgyz.14

Contextualizing Ethnic Violence in Osh

A city with a historically large population of ethnic Uzbeks, Osh is widely regarded as Kyrgyzstan's "capital of the South." The cultural and political relevance of Osh as the second city is further complicated by its location in the dynamic Fergana Valley and a long history of both peaceful and tumultuous coexistence between diverse populations. According to the 2009 census, 69.2% of the population of Kyrgyzstan is Kyrgyz, and the second largest ethnic group is Uzbeks, making up 14.7% of the population.15 The overwhelming majority of ethnic Uzbeks are concentrated in the South of the country, in key cities like Osh and Jalal-Abad. However, following the 2010 wave of ethnic violence in Osh, the demographics of the city drastically changed. Although official statistics are unavailable publicly, NGOs like Inter Bilim estimate that the Uzbek population of Osh, over 50% before the 2010 violence, is now under 30%.16 The location of Osh in the vibrant, ethnically diverse Fergana Valley has long been a breeding ground for tensions and periodic conflict during the Soviet period and beyond. Prior to significant displacement of the Uzbek population in the immediate aftermath of the 2010 events, ethnic Uzbeks made up a sizable majority in Osh and other parts of Southern Kyrgyzstan. The implications of such population dynamics posed unique challenges in a newly independent, post-Soviet Uzbekistan that were not emphasized under the Kyrgyz SSR. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, Tajiks and other ethnic groups coexisted in the region without artificially imposed borders, and under the greater jurisdiction of Moscow. Therefore, ethnic tensions and subsequent clashes can be characterized in an entirely different lens from the events of 2010.

The history of ethnic violence in Osh can be understood cyclically. Due to the historically large number of ethnic Uzbeks in the region, longstanding ethnic tensions, stereotypes, and other natural byproducts of coexistence between different ethnic groups emerged. The OSCE report1 on the June 2010 events in Southern Kyrgyzstan outlines some of the historically-rooted tensions between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in the region. Economically, the report highlights the emergence of social stresses between the two groups as industrialization attracted Kyrgyz and Uzbeks alike to industrial centers in the South. With the backdrop of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, economic depression was also a factor in the sociopolitical landscape of Southern Kyrgyzstan. The OSCE reports that during this period, "Competition for economic resources became strong and latent ethnic antagonisms more pronounced, particularly in the south where the Kyrgyz and Uzbek populations were relatively equal in number."18 As a result, stereotypes and ethnic perceptions of Uzbeks emerged within the broader context of a Kyrgyz nationalist narrative. Harmful stereotypes characterizing "Uzbeks as sly and cunning, based on trade-based livelihoods...feed into contemporary Kyrgyz resentment at Uzbek success in the south."19 Such stereotypes can be understood within the framework of precursors to major historic events such as ethnic conflict and genocide. For instance, the use of the word "sart," a derogatory term for Uzbeks used in the context of emerging Kyrgyz nationalism, is similarly rooted in this stereotype. In addition to economic tensions, the dominance of Kyrgyz officials in positions of power "resulted in a skewed patronage system" under which loyalties were emphasized, to the detriment of interethnic relations.20 Such factors created a climate conducive to a cycle of ethnic violence in Osh and Southern Kyrgyzstan.

Prior to the first significant outbreak of violence, pre-existing tensions led to periodic escalations. Aziza Abdyrasulova, a leading human rights activist whose work is informed by extensive experience in Osh dealing with issues of interethnic conflict, recounted an earlier case in 1968. According to Abdyrasulova, this instance of violence between Kyrgyz and Uzbek during the Soviet Union was "secret information," concealed by the Soviet authorities at the time due to lack of open information.21 As early as in the Kyrgyz SSR, the issue of interethnic conflict was established as a sensitive topic. A precedent of ethnic violence not being subject to open discussion was set. Similar to violence between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz, "the terminal decline of the Soviet state, the weakening of Moscow's central power over regions in Central Asia and the introduction of Gorbachev's reforms"22 created an atmosphere where the lack of rule of law, similar to the future case of 2010, would enable ethnic clashes.

The first openly documented wave of ethnic violence took place in June 1990 across Osh and Uzgen, two population strongholds of ethnic Uzbek minorities in Kyrgyzstan. Riots broke out across Osh city and province due to the pre-existing ethnic tensions among groups inhabiting the region. The 1990 riots resulted in 1,200 casualties, including over 300 dead and 462 injured.23 According to the OSCE report, 3,215 acts of crime were registered, ultimately leading to the conviction of 48 individuals, 80% of them Kyrgyz, "to lengthy prison sentences for the crimes of murder, attempted murder and rape."24 Due to the highly sensitized nature of the conflict, outbreaks of violence in Osh have come to be regarded in a cyclical nature, as taking place every twenty years because tensions remain unresolved. However, although the 1990s Osh riots can be understood as a precursor to the larger outbreak in 2010, one key difference is emphasized by human rights activists and civil society actors working on the issue: the 1990s riots took place during the time of the Soviet Union, allowing for swift Russian military intervention and therefore lower casualties. The role of an overarching body, namely Soviet authorities, in mitigating ethnic violence and its effects remains a key facet to analysis of ethnic violence in Osh in a post-Soviet context. In response to the ethnic violence in Osh, Kyrgyz authorities formally appealed to the CSTO for assistance. Human Rights Watch reports: "On June 12, two days after the violence erupted, Roza Otunbaeva sent an official request to Russian President Dmitry Medvedev requesting military assistance. Medvedev replied that the violence in Kyrgyzstan was an internal matter and that neither Russia nor the CSTO could intervene."

Osh Events of 2010

When discussing the events that occurred in Osh in June of 2010, one word comes up time and time again: "sensitive". It is therefore a remarkable achievement that a reliable report was published with the acquiescence of the Kyrgyz government detailing the events. The most definitive account of the June 2010 events was authored by Dr. Kimmo Kiljunen, the Special Representative for Central Asia at the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly under the auspices of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry into the Events in Southern Kyrgyzstan.26 The report provides statistics on the toll of the conflict and concludes that "the events resulted in significant loss of life and injury, of which the majority of victims were ethnic Uzbeks."27 The conflict occurred between June 10 and 14 left about 470 people dead, 400,000 displaced, and 2,800 properties damaged.28 The timeline of events and factors that led to such devastation deserve close examination. Ultimately, there were social, political, and economic factors that can be identified as variables that combined to produce a conflict.

The Osh 2010 events were an ethnic conflict that caused immense pain on both sides, but disproportionality affected Uzbeks. Human rights defender Aziza Abdyrasulova described the conflict as pitting "brother against brother,"29 which is indicative of the fact that Uzbeks and Kyrgyz have a great deal in common. Most people from both ethnicities are Sunni Muslims, the Uzbek and Kyrgyz languages are both similar Turkic languages, and they inhabit a common region. Several discussions highlighted the frequent stereotypes comparing Uzbeks and Kyrgyz, such as the idea that while the Kyrgyz are a historically nomadic people, Uzbeks tend to be urban and entrepreneurial. It is true that "Kyrgyz are dominant in public service positions, including in the police and other security agencies, the prosecution services and the judiciary."30 As a result, there was a factor of the Kyrgyz taking advantage of the government resources they could access. The extent of security force involvement in the conflict remains unclear, but is often characterized as falling between complicity or indifference. On the complicity end, there were reports that "crowds of attackers seized firearms and ammunition from the military and police in circumstances largely unopposed by troops or officers. Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) were also surrendered."31 This situation clearly demonstrates the lack of either state capacity or will to quell violence and keep the peace. "The military personnel under the command of the Provisional Government numbered 2,000. The KIC is of the opinion that had those troops been properly instructed and deployed, it would have been possible to prevent or stop the violence."

Given that security services were, and still remain, dominated by Kyrgyz, this further highlights the ethnic dimension of the conflict and the challenges associated with keeping the peace if the people tasked with doing so are uninterested in doing so, or, worse, assisting with the violence. The main precipitating driver of this conflict was the political landscape in Kyrgyzstan at the time, in particular the turmoil over top leadership of the country. Academic literature suggests that "structural causes–political elite fragmentation and a civil society that can readily be mobilized for both liberal and illiberal ends–are behind the June 2010 ethnic violence."

The President of Kyrgyzstan, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, was ousted in April 2010, which led to a power vacuum across the country and subsequent lack of rule of law. Political fragmentation ensued as all major actors sought to secure their interests and ensure the new cadre of people in power would act in their favor. Although alarm around Uzbek separatism in the South, such as in the isolated case of Kadyrzhan Batyrov, and a harmful perception of Uzbeks as a fifth column aiming to undermine Kyrgyz national interests played a role in tensions, the absence of rule of law and power vacuum were the main factors exploited during the 2010 violence.34 Furthermore, nationalism was also employed as a method of consolidating political power, which heightened ethnic tensions. Southern Kyrgyz felt threatened by the chaos that resulted and Bakiyev, who was a Southern Kyrgyz himself, fled to his hometown near Jalalabad. In May in Jalalabad, "Bakiyev supporters occupied an administrative building before being expelled by force by a group of activists largely composed of members of Rodina, an ethnically Uzbek-based political party suppressed under the Bakiyev regime. Later the same day, Bakiyev's residence and a number of other houses owned by ethnic Kyrgyz were set alight, evidently by ethnic Uzbeks. Some officials in the region hold that this event was the catalyst that ignited the interethnic violence in Osh a month afterwards, by arousing Kyrgyz fears of an Uzbek uprising in retaliation for the riots in 1990."

This series of events is a salient example of the downside of Kyrgyzstan's relatively open culture and landscape for civil society. On one hand, Kyrgyz democracy leaves space for civil society groups like Rodina to operate. On the other, it grants enough executive power to the president to repress these groups, which then leads to civil society groups such as Rodina to undertake harmful actions, eventually leading to backlash then open conflict. This case also demonstrates the use of civil society for harmful means. This process was described to us by an activist at Interbilim who stated that Edil Baisalov threatened their organization with competing NGOs, essentially weaponizing the open space for civil society into a tool used for political disputes. Power struggles among the political elite and the distorted use of civil society both occurred in April and May in the run-up to the conflict. The events in June 2010 were directly set off by two main situations that escalated quickly. First, "a brawl between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz at a casino," followed by "the alleged rape of Kyrgyz women at a university dormitory." Widespread violence ensued.

Economic factors also played a role in sparking the conflict. In 2009, the economic situation of Kyrgyzstan was deteriorating due to "mismanagement as well as low global prices for gold, Kyrgyzstan's main export commodity."38 A series of price hikes in early 2010 on utilities39 also contributed to Bakiev's removal. Economic hardship sets the conditions for political turmoil and conflict. The Kygryz perception of Uzbek economic prosperity, perhaps at Kyrgyzstan's expense, also fueled resentment that eventually boiled over.

Present-Day

The tragedy did not stop when the conflict stopped. In fact, much of the injustice of the June 2010 events lingers to this day because there were never any independent judicial investigations. There was a significant perversion of justice, to include selective prosecutions of Uzbeks, intimidation of lawyers defending Uzbeks, and acts of torture. "Criminal investigations and trials which have resulted from the June events have been marked by breaches of the ICCPR fair trial rights."40

Historical Similarities and Differences in Response

The government response to the 1990 and 2010 instances of ethnic violence were similar in some aspects and different in others. After both conflicts, the government created new institutions (and new bureaucracy) to address deep rooted issues. After 1990, the Kygryz federal government opened an Uzbek National Cultural Centre (UNCC). "The centres became the main outlet for Uzbek political participation and the expression of minority demands."41 Yet, Uzbek political participation remained low and the reemergence of violence in 2010 is a strong indicator that the UNCC was not sufficient to address the issues faced by the Uzbek minority living in Kygryz society. The UNCC is similar to an institution set up in the aftermath of 2010, coined the State Agency for Local Self-Government and Interethnic Relations (GAMSUMO).

GAMSUMO was designed to provide early warning of any ethnic conflict, but reporting indicates that it is ineffective and led by incompetent leadership. Lack of accountability is a major difference between the 2010 conflict and the clashes from the 1990s. In the 1990s, Soviet forces were able to quell the violence and "at the end of the crisis over one thousand troops stayed for six months to keep peace and allow investigations to take place. Proper prosecution and fair trials followed."

In practically every discussion with activists and citizens of Kyrgyzstan, it becomes apparent that the lack of independent investigations and fair trials is a key reason why the events of 2010 are still such a sensitive topic and also why ethnic tensions in Osh remain somewhat elevated. Without a basis of accountability and justice, it becomes very difficult to move forward on any of the other pressing issues identified by the UN such as "such as the underrepresentation of minorities; cases of claimed unfair treatment by law enforcement and in the provision of public services; and issues relating to resource management."

The Case of Azimjan Askarov

No case is more illustrative of this phenomenon than that of Azimjan Askarov. Azimjan Askarov was an ethnically Uzbek citizen of Kyrgyzstan and human rights defender who was arrested two days into the 2010 conflict. While Askarov did not focus primarily on Uzbek issues before the conflict, the chaos and breakdown in rule of law created cover for authorities to detain him. He was accused of "inciting ethnic hatred and murdering a policeman,"45 and subsequently tortured and sentenced to life imprisonment without a fair trial. "In 2016, the UN Human Rights Committee found that Askarov had been arbitrarily detained and tortured, and called for Askarov's immediate release and the quashing of his conviction."46 Kyrgyzstan did not comply with the ruling, therefore violating its international legal obligations. The case even promoted President Atambayev to manipulate the supremacy clause of the Kygryz constitution to ensure that international law was not above domestic law in Kyrgyzstan and "to prevent the UN's Human Rights Committee (OHCHR) from intervening in Kyrgyzstan's internal affairs." This series of events weakened the human rights agreements and covenants in force in Kyrgyzstan. The Kyrgyz government stood firm on keeping Askarov in prison, which left the government at severe loggerheads with international organizations and Western embassies. Many western diplomats express regret how the Askarov case was handled. Western diplomats were simultaneously vocal about their opposition to his imprisonment while also prioritizing engagement and economic ties with the Kygryz government with the goal of increased leverage. Charles Garrett, the British Ambassador to the Kyrgyz Republic, stated that "In hindsight, some argue that the West shouted too loudly, so it increased the pressure on the courts too much and pushed them into a defensive position."48 Raymonds Vingris, a representative of the Delegation of the EU in Kyrgyzstan, explained that "the government wouldn't release him, because even if they did, it would be admitting fault and putting their legitimacy in question."49 The Kygryz government also used the risk of another ethnic conflict to justify keeping Askarov in prison, although the blatant lack of accountability is what is most likely to provoke another ethnic conflict. Askarov died in the summer of 2020 after being jailed for 10 years. In an interview with Askarov's lawyer, Valerian Vakhitov, he described Askarov as a uniquely impressive person whose "spirit was undefeated" and continued on with his human rights work despite being condemned to a life sentence.

Tajikistan-Kyrgyzstan Border Conflict

In addition to the issue of disputed Soviet-era borders, resource access has been a historically contentious source of tensions along the border between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The allocation of water resources, land and pastures was a source of disputes even during the Soviet era, under the jurisdiction of a larger administrative body. These tensions came to light most recently during the April 2021 border conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which remains highly sensitive, unresolved, and further complicated by factors of Kyrgyz nationalism, negative sentiment towards Tajiks, and "decades of deteriorating relations" between the two republics.51 The conflict first broke out on April 28, 2021, when Tajik authorities installed surveillance cameras at a water reservoir near Vorukh, a Soviet-era Tajik enclave surrounded by Kyrgyzstan.52 A local-level conflict over access to water resources ensued, featuring "fist-fights and stone-throwing," quickly escalating "to gunfire and unconfirmed reports of heavy machine guns and mortars," and militarization across the border by the Kyrgyz and Tajik sides.53 As a result, 36 Kyrgyz and at least 16 Tajiks died, over 200 were injured, and approximately 65,000 people displaced.54 According to RFE/RL Kyrgyzstan, "78 private homes, two schools, one medical point, two border checkpoints, a kindergarten, 10 gasoline stations, a police building, and eight shops were destroyed in Kyrgyzstan's southwestern region of Batken."55 Meanwhile, statistics from the Tajik side are much more difficult to obtain due to the authoritarian government in place.

Currently, the situation at the border remains tense, highly militarized, and speculations of future violence prevail. Conflict surrounding land, pastures and water which contributed to the initial outbreak of violence are not resolved, and no effective management systems have been implemented to prevent future violence. To this day, "At least 11 citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic detained on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border are kept in prisons of the Republic of Tajikistan in inhuman conditions,"56 a claim corroborated by Bakyt Rysbekov, the Director of the National Center for Prevention of Torture.57 Prisoners face life sentences, closed trials, arbitrary detention and inhumane conditions, including the death of a 68 year-old Kyrgyz national who died in Tajik prison.58 Moreover, human rights activist Gulgaky Mamasalieva from InterBilim described her experiences being arrested by Tajik forces.59 Like many others, she unknowingly wandered into a Tajik enclave, was detained, extorted and had her life threatened by Tajik authorities. Such cases remain common at the highly militarized border, and shootings, including one as recent as June 3, 2022, which left two Kyrgyz servicemen wounded, regularly disrupt the precarious peace.

Policy Alternatives

In order to best address the problems outlined above, we have identified many potential policy courses of action in order to address the symptoms in the short-term, and the root causes of the problems in the long-term.

Investigation of 2010 Ethnic Violence in Osh

As aptly put by civil society activist Aziza Abdyrasulova, "When there is no justice, there will be repetition."60 The lack of accountability for perpetrators of violence during the 2010 events prevents justice for the victims, who are predominantly ethnic Uzbeks. This lingering discontent threatens the stability of the region, and could cause another ethnic conflict if not addressed due to the sensitive and highly contentious nature of discussions surrounding the issue. In order to avoid a repetition of violence, there must be an investigation into the conflict, punishment for the perpetrators, and justice for the victims of the 2010 ethnic violence in Osh. There has been no justice in Askarov's case, and the events are a stain on Kyrgyzstan's human rights record. Accountability is of the utmost importance, not only for Askarov's family and those who knew him, but to ensure that human rights violations to include torture and arbitrary detention are not normalized or accepted in Kyrgyzstan. A lack of accountability can create a permissive environment for continued human rights violations, therefore it is of the utmost importance to conclude Askarov's case in a manner that will discourage the Kygryz government, at every level, from similar behavior going forward. A lawyer representing Askarov's family, Bakyt Avtandil, is calling for an investigation into his death in order to charge the officials guilty for his death and to hold people accountable. Mr. Avtandil is "preparing an appeal to the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights about the inaction of the investigative authorities."61 He expressed his hope that "a conclusive investigation of Askarov's case could bring closure to ethnic tensions which remain high."62 However, it is possible that continuing to draw attention to the Askarov case could distract attention and resources from cases where people are still languishing in jail. In addition, the government refused to comply with UN rulings when Askarov was alive, which makes it unlikely that they would take a politically costly action when the issue is no longer in the limelight. Furthermore, the judicial investigations are unlikely to be impartial since so many officials were complicit with the Askarov case. Askarov's case is a tragic example, but the problem of selective prosecutions and human rights abuses in relation to the June 2010 events extends beyond Askarov. There are about 40 Uzbeks serving life sentences in the aftermath of 2010.63 This is a direct, visible, and ongoing example of the effects of systemic discrimination against Uzbeks. Vakhitov stated that it was likely that "most of them were arbitrarily or unlawfully committed."64 Reviewing and reopening cases related to June 2010 would go a long way towards the restoration of justice and reconciliation in Kygryz society. Vakhitov would urge the Krygyz government to comply with UN Human Rights Rulings and end all arbitrary detentions, torture and human rights abuses immediately. Bakyt Rysbekov stated that "every single case should be reexamined."

In order to achieve specific outcomes, our policy proposal would focus on just the 40 cases of life sentences, since it is not realistic that every case related to 2010 could be reopened. By reviewing the cases of the people who are still suffering as a result of ethnic hatred in 2010, Kyrgyzstan has an opportunity to impact many of its citizens' lives for the better and perhaps reduce lingering resentment over cases that are ongoing. In addition, 40 is a limited number of cases that seems manageable in terms of the resources required to reexamine them. It must be said that there are downsides to reopening these cases. Kygryz government officials would argue that reopening the cases could inflame ethnic tensions and lead to further violence. They would also claim that there was no discrimination at the structural level against Uzbeks and that reopening cases would constitute interference with an independent judicial process.

Moreover, efforts to create interethnic dialogue and promote a multiethnic Kyrgyz identity are a policy measure that can be adopted by the government to mitigate ethnic tensions. According to the OSCE Report, "the State should take a strong public stand against extreme nationalism and ethnic exclusivity by declaring that Kyrgyzstan is a multiethnic society and facilitating the integration of its minorities into all spheres of public life."67 Such efforts can be supplemented by support for civil society actors and NGOs working to create interethnic dialogue between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in the South, such as Interbilim and other organizations. Policies undermining Krygyz nationalism, which often comes at the expense of ethnic minority groups such as the Uzbeks concentrated in the South, have the potential to mitigate ethnic tensions and create an environment that can foster more open dialogue and sensitive issues that heighten the risk of future violence. However, such policies are often abstract and difficult to implement in practice due to their implications being long-term in nature. Additionally, the current environment of populism and a surge of Kyrgyz nationalism in Kyrgyzstan presents obstacles to legislation tackling these issues, which are on a rise at the national level. Lastly, a policy measure the government can take to address ethnic violence in Southern Kyrgyzstan is implementing a program for reparations and compensation to victims of the June 2010 events. Beyond revisiting open cases and bringing them to justice, providing compensation and actively seeking reparations for people impacted during the 2010 events, who were predominantly Uzbeks, can bring justice and closure to the communities impacted. According to the OSCE's recommendation, "the Government should, as a matter of priority, create a comprehensive reparation programme to provide victims with adequate material compensation for loss and rehabilitation," and "should undertake symbolic measures aimed at affirming to the society as a whole that the victims of June 2010 are citizens of Kyrgyzstan."68 However, the nature of the issue and sensitivity surrounding it present obstacles to the prioritization of such an agenda, as does the factor of cost. Without reliance on international donors, such an expensive program is unlikely to receive funding from the government budget.

Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan Border Conflict

Although defining the Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan border seems like an obvious solution, the issue is much more complicated than simply arbitrarily drawing a line on a map, since it has remained disputed for over thirty years. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan share 971 kilometers of border, and 471 kilometers are disputed.69 The problem stems from the use of "two different geopolitical maps: Tajikistan operates with maps from 1924-1939 and the Kyrgyz Republic with a map from 1958-1959."70 According to Abdybai Shakirbaevich Dzhailobayev, the Deputy Director of the Agency for Water Resource Management under the Ministry of Agriculture, both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan currently have commissions to decide on the on the disputed border, but it has not made any progress because the commissions are comprised of "every member of government with an interest," and are therefore unable to come to a consensus.71 Because Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have not been able to delineate the border by themselves, it could be helpful to allow a neutral actor to mediate, such as Russia or the United Nations. Introducing a mediator would be beneficial because it would allow the two sides to make concessions while still retaining face with their respective populations. The drawback of an independent mediator is the perceived threat that an external presence would pose to the sovereignty of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

Next, if ever able to be decided on, the border needs to be enforced. Because the border is so contentious, the enforcement cannot "use the traditional methods of strict demarcation," and would require a clearly marked buffer zone."72 A clearly marked border and buffer zone means that clashes over the border are much less likely–for example, the Kyrgyz border with Kazakhstan is agreed upon, and there are virtually no disagreements over the border, unlike with Tajikistan, and to a lesser extent Uzbekistan. There are a few cons to this solution, however. The buffer zone would require 3-5 km of neutral territory around the border, which would displace residents living right up against the border.

This is expensive–it requires compensation and relocation for displaced people away from the border. In addition, in order to make sure that the buffer zone is respected, it may be necessary to introduce neutral peacekeepers, which both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan may again perceive as threats to their sovereignty. A Central Asian Schengen model is an alternative to a militarized border between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The concept of the Schengen area comes from a policy of the European Union, in which people and goods can circulate between Schengen States without internal border controls. A Central Asian Schengen has already been proposed in March of 2021 between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, called the Silk Road multiple-entry tourist visa, with Kyrgyzstan having expressed interest in joining".74 Allowing for fluid motion over the border would allow for more relative normalcy for those living in what would be the buffer zone, with the ability to cross the border for work and maintain ethnic communities across national borders. Of course, the border would still need to be agreed upon or else there would be a very strong risk of ethnic conflict as national identity would play a smaller role with fluid border crossings. The possibility of regional peacekeeping forces has also been raised as a potential solution to the border conflict. As members of the Collective Security Treaty Alliance (CSTO), a regional security alliance headed by Russia, both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have commitments to refrain from territorial disputes and claims over each other. Kyrgyz politician Bolot Shamirkanov, who believed the CSTO had an obligation to get involved in the Kyrgyz-Tajik border conflict, cited the Treaty's charter: "According to the CSTO charter, none of the participating countries shall interfere in the internal affairs of other members, including territorial disputes, since the goal of the CSTO is collective defence from external threats."75 Although regional peacekeeping forces may enforce a ceasefire in practice, its negative implications most likely outweigh the benefits. Inviting Russian military presence onto the contested border of two post-Soviet republics still in the process of asserting their sovereignty sets a dangerous precedent and has grave geopolitical implications. Moreover, Russian interest in resolving the border conflict is necessary to invoke CSTO protocol; however, Russia has no incentive or self-interest in implementing such a policy.

Furthermore, fostering local cooperation efforts on water, land and pasture projects is a potential course of action for local authorities in mitigating tensions at the border. Although the border conflict has now escalated to a national-level, highly militarized conflict, it is at its core a local issue. One organization dealing with water issues in Asia, The Third Pole, recommends community solutions to addressing questions of water and land rights along the border. "Cooperative arrangements have the capacity to lower tensions," the Third Pole reports, citing the case of Ak-Suu river shared between Kyrgyz and Tajiks. 76 Mediating local discussions and cooperative agreements on resource use could be the catalyst for concrete policies at the municipal level or local monitoring of water, land and pasture use. However, such an approach requires the engagement of Tajik and Kyrgyz locals alike, both of whom fall under the jurisdictions of different governments. Therefore, an approach like this would require the active engagement of civil society and human rights organizations to ensure personal freedoms of peoples living in Tajik exclaves within the borders of Kyrgyzstan, which are considerably more restricted than those of Kyrgyz citizens who do not live under an authoritarian regime.

Representative Democracy as a Policy Measure

With the rise of Kyrgyz nationalism under President Japarov, it is important that the demographics of Kyrgyz government officials reflect the ethnic makeup of the country. This means that ethnic Uzbeks and Tajiks should represent Uzbek or Tajik areas within Kyrgyzstan, in government, policing, etc, what Professor Medet Tiulegenov at the American University of Central Asia calls "sub-ethnic politics." Deputy Chairman to the Cabinet of Ministers, Edil Baisalov, believes that the Kyrgyz Government is “not doing enough recruiting of Uzbek policemen [or] government officials.”

In Osh Oblast, in the Fergana Valley, 28% of the population is Uzbek, and there are districts where the population of ethnic Uzbeks is as high as 50%, such as Aravan, Kara-Suu, and Uzgen, but local governments and chiefs of police are all ethnic Kyrgyz, appointed by officials in Bishkek.

Increasing transparency in the appointment process will ensure that majority-minority regions are represented by competent officials who represent the ethnic groups they serve, thereby increasing trust in officials at the local level and potentially mitigating ethnic tensions.

Because the government has largely failed to get ethnic minorities elected into positions of power in Kyrgyzstan, the Kyrgyz government could consider implementing a quota system that reflects the ethnic makeup of the electoral district. Kyrgyzstan already has a gender quota system that reserves 30 per cent of the seats in the country’s 452 local councils for women.”80 Introducing a similar quota system for ethnic minorities would efficiently ensure legislative diversity and statistical representation. Other ethnic quota systems in Asia, such as in Taiwan and Singapore, showed a “decrease in social exclusion and structural inequities over time,” but even with quota systems gaps still remain between the ethnic minorities and the dominant group because of “structural inequities between ethnic groups.”

In addition, the introduction of quota systems might exacerbate pre-existing ethnic tensions between the groups, especially if the majority group of ethnic Kyrgyz feels threatened by the relative loss of power. As a final con, quota systems are not a permanent solution—quota systems serve as a social elevator, but do not guarantee competency. Member of Parliament Dastan Bekeshev explained how some MPs currently serving in Parliament due to the quota system are “afraid to raise critical questions,”82 so MPs of ethnic minorities are not guaranteed to effectively advocate for their constituencies due to pressure from the majority.

Policy Recommendations
Ethnic Violence in Osh

The continued sensitivity and lack of closure surrounding the Osh events in 2010 creates high risk for future violence in the South of Kyrgyzstan. The legacy of the violence and injustice is one that is passed down through generations, posing unique challenges for ethnic conflict that is cyclical in nature. Therefore, policies must be implemented to mitigate future risk of violence, promote reconciliation and achieve justice.

As a short-term solution, the Kyrgyz government must conclude a comprehensive investigation into the case of Azmijan Askarov and re-examine cases and detentions related to Osh 2010 events. Although Askarov passed away in 2021, his case remains extremely relevant to unresolved ethnic tensions in the South of Kyrgyzstan. His arrest, arbitrary detention, torture and subsequent deaths are a glaring stain on Kyrgyzstan's human rights record, and a source of great pain for communities impacted by the violence in 2010 to this day. Justice for Azmijan Askarov could be the first concrete step on the path to reconciliation and healing for communities still grappling with the recent aftermath of the deadly violence in Osh. The losses, both material and personal, of the 2010 events remain prevalent in the memory of Kyrgyz and Uzbeks alike, heightened by the sensitivity, taboo and silence surrounding the issue. Therefore, by concluding the investigation on the circumstances surrounding Askarov's death and holding those who were guilty accountable, the Kyrgyz government could set the precedent for future reconciliation and justice for all victims of the Osh events. Although it may be too late for Askarov, the pending cases of those who face life sentences, arbitrary detention and similar circumstances to Askarov must be re-opened, re-examined and brought to justice. Arbitrary detention and torture of ethnic Uzbeks and other cases relating to the 2010 violence must be ended immediately, and the rulings of the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights upheld by the Japarov administration and future governments. Because many of these arrests were made by local authorities during the height of violence in Osh, the charges must be reviewed to ensure those implicated are ensured the civil liberties under the full extent of Kyrgyz law and international standards.

As a long-term solution, the need for ethnic representation among local authorities in the South of Kyrgyzstan and increased transparency in appointment processes is necessary for mitigating future outbreaks of ethnic violence. Following the Osh 2010 violence, part of the sensitivity surrounding the topic is distrust of local officials. Due to lack of transparency in the appointment process of local officials, police officers and government representatives, areas with large populations of ethnic Uzbeks do not see this diversity reflected among local authorities who are often appointed through unbureaucratic processes from Bishkek. In lieu of the disproportionate prosecution of ethnic Uzbeks after the 2010 events, the lack of such representation at the local level breeds a continuing distrust between locals and officials in Osh, Jalal-Abad, Arslanbob and other strongholds of ethnic Uzbek minorities. In order to mitigate the effects of the lack of representation, a more representative model of local governance must be adopted through transparent appointment processes. In turn, trust between local authorities and populations will increase over time, decreasing sensitivity around the issue, easing ethnic tensions and preventing the outbreak of future violence in the long-run.

Moreover, efforts to create interethnic dialogue and promote a multiethnic Kyrgyz identity are a policy measure that can be adopted by the government to mitigate ethnic tensions. According to the OSCE Report, "the State should take a strong public stand against extreme nationalism and ethnic exclusivity by declaring that Kyrgyzstan is a multiethnic society and facilitating the integration of its minorities into all spheres of public life." Such efforts can be supplemented by support for civil society actors and NGOs working to create interethnic dialogue between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in the South, such as Interbilim and other organizations. Because discussions surrounding the issue remain highly sensitized and contentious, allowing the room for civil society organizations to bridge ethnic gaps through community-based discussions can be an effective mitigator of ethnic tensions and prevent future outbreaks of violence. In addition, the Kyrgyz government should invest in training multilingual teachers in order to promote multilingual education in southern Kyrgyzstan, providing ethnic Uzbeks the same schooling and economic opportunities as ethnic Kyrgyz and Russians.

Tajikistan Border Conflict

In the short term, increasing local cooperation on access to resources is an effective policy to mitigate future conflict along the Tajik-Kyrgyz border. Due to the inherently local nature of the border conflict, efforts at the national level and militarization across the border must be decreased and replaced with local, grassroots efforts instead. By promoting cooperation on water, land and pasture projects between Tajiks and Kyrgyz in Tajik exclaves within the area of Kyrgyzstan such as Batken, the government can empower locals to pursue a peaceful alternative to settling water disputes. Dialogue at the local level and water/pasture rights agreements can be facilitated through the work of human rights organizations and increased communication with residents and local authorities who monitor the situation. In the long term, creating room for civil society and human rights organizations to function within Tajik exclaves, where the rights of civilians are more restricted due to the authoritarian government whose jurisdiction they fall under, will ensure the personal rights of locals impacted by water resource issues and the border conflict. Such measures will afford the opportunity for conflict resolution in the long term and an effective ceasefire in the short.

To Conclude

Among a dynamic political landscape and unique contemporary challenges, the fallout and ongoing effects of ethnic violence in Kyrgyzstan remain low points on its human rights record. Through tumultuous revolutions and an ever-changing political environment, Kyrgyzstan's commitment to addressing the painful aftermath of ethnic tensions and going border-conflict as a multi-ethnic, multinational state in the modern sense must be emphasized as a policy priority by both current and future administrations. Without active efforts to mitigate ethnic tensions and violence in the Fergana valley, the cyclical violence, one tainted by a contemporary rise in nationalism and a post-Soviet legacy, will continue posing unique challenges to Kyrgyzstan and the broader Central Asian region.

References

Footnotes 1Liam Abbate. "The Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Border: A Legacy of Soviet Imperialism." Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship 4, no. 1 (2021): 4, 2 2 Ibid 3 Anchita Borthakur. "An Analysis of the Conflict in the Ferghana Valley." Asian Af airs 48, no. 2 (2017): 334. https://doi.org/10.1080/03068374.2017.1313591. 4 4"Kyrgyzstan: Widening Ethnic Divisions in the South," 2012, p. ii 5 5Bruce Pannier. "Future Kyrgyz Government Faces Traditional North-South Divide." RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. Future Kyrgyz Government Faces Traditional North-South Divide, April 27, 2010. 6 Ibid 7 Ibid 88"Kyrgyzstan: North-South Split Poses Political Risk - Poll." Eurasianet, October 8, 2010. https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyzstan-north-south-split-poses-political-risk-poll. 9 "Ferghana Valley Five Year Humanitarian Trends Assessment - Iris." Inter-agency Regional Analysis Network France, March 2017, 4 https://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Ferghana-Valley-Report.pdf GET MORE
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